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Abstract

Upon his election to the presidency, Joseph R. Biden Jr. was the first Democratic President
elected in a half century with extensive “Washington experience,” that is experience as a
Senator, Congressman, or Cabinet Member. In doing so, he brought a different perspective to the
White House, one that was familiar with the electoral, legislative, and organizational institutions
that the leader of the Democratic party must manage. In addition, this experience has led Biden
to be more trusting of the formal Democratic Party infrastructure and therefore more able to use
it to support his goals. In comparison to former Presidents Clinton and Obama, I find that
Biden’s Washington experience has led him to be more successful in legislating and in
organizing the Democratic Party, but with little to no change in the electoral results of the party.
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Chapter 1: Introduction.
The modern president is not only the commander-in-chief, chief legislator, and chief
executive of the United States government, but he also serves as the de facto leader of his
political party. His legislative, electoral, and political success or failure determines the
perception of his political party to the public. As de facto leader of his party, he is nominally in
charge of the messaging, fundraising, and organizational structure of the party. Since 1992 the
Democratic party has elected three different presidents: two with limited “Washington
experience,” Presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, and one with extensive “Washington
experience,” President Joe Biden. These men have had different dispositions and approaches to
their role as party leader and chief legislator. Over the past thirty years, the Democratic Party has
seen varying levels of legislative and electoral success, and given the influence of these men, it
stands that they have affected their party’s success.
This thesis examines whether the differing personal approaches and biographies of
President Clinton, President Obama, and President Biden have impacted the Democratic Party’s
legislative and electoral success as well as the overall health of the national Democratic Party
during their tenures. This question gives insight into desirable traits for future Democratic
presidents concerning their role of Democratic party leader. The current American political
environment and public seems to favor candidates with less “Washington experience,” that is
time spent in Washington as a Congressman, Senator, or executive branch employee. This thesis
explores whether the nomination of these candidates is truly favorable for the legislative,
electoral, and political success of the Democratic party. As the Democratic party is one of only
two major political parties in the United States, understanding the role of the president on the
party’s political success is of utmost priority for all American political scientists.
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Literature Review
Can the Personal Characteristics of a President Impact his Success?
Whether presidents have the ability to personally impact their own success is a heavily
debated topic in political science scholarship. In 1960, Richard Neustadt, a former aide of
President Truman and one of the progenitors of modern scholarship on the presidency, famously
wrote that “Presidential power is the power to persuade.”1 He includes the ability to persuade
Congress, the ability to persuade the electorate, and the ability to persuade co-partisans. Neustadt
wrote that this view is “commonly accept[ed] in the sphere of congressional relations.”2
Likewise, political scientist James W. Davis contends that “while the president faces numerous
constraints in our Madisonian system of checks and balances, he nevertheless can, if he has the
inclination and leadership drive, use his party ties to lead the nation to new heights.”3 In more
modern times, political scientist Daniel Galvin has argued that “presidents can, and often do,
alter their structural confines and ‘restructure the political landscape.’”4
Journalist John Dickerson agrees specifically on the ability of the president to influence
Congress writing “A hero president might break through the [instability of Congress] and make it
work better.”5 These ‘individual agency’ scholars all believe that the president’s personal skills
and personality can be an effective tool and therefore an independent variable in determining the
president’s success.

1

Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Power of Leadership (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960). 10
Neustadt. 37
3
James W. Davis, The President as Party Leader, Contributions in Political Science, no. 295 (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1992), 14.
4
Daniel J. Galvin, “Presidents as Agents of Change: Presidents as Agents of Change,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 44, no. 1 (March 2014): 95–119, https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12089.
5
John Dickerson, The Hardest Job in the World: The American Presidency, First edition (New York: Random
House, 2020), 137.
2
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Although still popular in the press, this viewpoint has also been challenged. Detractors of
this idea include Vox Editor Ezra Klein who derisively termed it the “Green Lantern Theory” of
politics6 and presidential scholar George C. Edwards, who argues that presidents are largely
unable to move the public. Edwards also holds that presidents cannot significantly alter the will
of Congress.7 Rather, Edwards argues that presidents succeed “by recognizing and exploiting
effectively the opportunities already present” and that their Congressional influence comes
largely from the size of their party’s majorities in Congress.8 If Edwards, Klein, and the
‘environment’ scholars are correct, presidents’ personalities and backgrounds would have no
influence on their legislative or electoral success, rather making their results simply outcomes of
the political environment.
In this thesis, I will align with the ideas of scholars such as Davis and Galvin who believe
that presidents have personal agency in their party’s legislative, electoral, and political success.
This thesis attempts to add to the critiques of scholars such as Edwards who hold that
presidential personality and skill do not determine the success of the president. Furthermore, this
thesis seeks to show that the nomination of presidents with less “Washington experience” such as
Clinton and Obama have proved less effective to the goals of the Democratic party as compared
to the nomination of a president with extensive “Washington experience” such as Biden. I will
now analyze the scholarship on the issues of presidential electoral success, legislative or
congressional success, and party building success.

Ezra Klein, “The Green Lantern Theory of the Presidency,” Vox, May 20, 2014,
https://www.vox.com/2014/5/20/5732208/the-green-lantern-theory-of-the-presidency-explained.
7
George C. Edwards, Overreach: Leadership in the Obama Presidency (Princeton ; Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2012), 2.
8
Edwards, Overreach. ix
6
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Measuring the Determinates of Success
Legislative success is the ability of presidents to get their legislative agenda passed by
Congress. Neustadt argues that presidents are able to persuade Congress to change their minds
and votes on his agenda. According to this theory, since Congress is dependent upon the public’s
approval, the president’s ability to influence Congress would in turn be dependent on his
standing with the public as well as his persuasive ability.9 Other theorists, such as Ferejohn and
Calvert, also believe that presidents can increase their support in Congress through increased
public opinion support. Since “most congressmen wish for re-election or advancement to higher
office,”10 if they believe alignment with a president would give them more support, then they
would be more likely to support his agenda. Therefore, presidents would be able to persuade
Congress not only through the unquantifiable measurement of personal persuasion, but also
through their approval rating.
According to Edwards, legislative success should be directly correlated with the size of
the president’s party’s majorities in Congress, with the president’s ability to influence these
majorities existing only “at the margins.”11 Therefore, presidents should experience greater
success when their party controls larger margins in Congress and vice-versa.
Much scholarship regarding the president’s electoral influence is based upon the
“coattails” or “surge and decline” theories which political scientist James Campbell describes as
when “in a presidential election year a successful presidential candidate assists in the election of

9

Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Power of Leadership.
John A. Ferejohn and Randall L. Calvert, “Presidential Coattails in Historical Perspective,” American Journal of
Political Science 28, no. 1 (February 1984): 128, https://doi.org/10.2307/2110790.
11
George C. Edwards, At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress (Yale University Press, 1989), 185,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1dr383p.
10
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his party's slate of candidates.”12 This theory postulates that voters are likely to vote for the
congressional co-partisans of whichever candidate they vote for president. Therefore, in elections
when the president is not on the ballot, the support for the president’s party naturally falls.13
This theory would hold that regardless of the president’s actions, his party will lose
congressional support in the midterm elections.
Another leading argument is that voters align their opinion of a president’s political party
with their opinion of the president.14 Therefore, popular presidents are likely to increase voters’
support for their political party and indirectly assist in electing more members of their party to
office.15 There is also research that demonstrates the impact of ‘negative coattails,’ where a low
presidential approval rating causes subsequent losses for his party down ballot.16 Empirical
evidence shows that presidential approval ratings having a positive partisan correlation with
House,17 Senate,18 and state legislative elections,19 as well as a “modest, but significant” impact
on Gubernatorial elections.20 Others, such as Bafumi et al. argue that the increased support for

James E. Campbell, “Presidential Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections,” American
Political Science Review 80, no. 1 (March 1986): 46, https://doi.org/10.2307/1957083.
13
Campbell, 46.
14
Gary C. Jacobson, “How Presidents Shape Their Party’s Reputation and Prospects: New Evidence: New
Evidence,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (March 2015): 26, https://doi.org/10.1111/psq.12168.
15
Ferejohn and Calvert, “Presidential Coattails in Historical Perspective,” 128; Elliott Fullmer and Rebecca Daniel,
“Invisible Coattails: Presidential Approval and Gubernatorial Elections, 1994–2014,” The Forum 16, no. 2 (July 26,
2018): 283, https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2018-0013; Edward R. Tufte, “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm
Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review 69, no. 3 (September 1975): 283,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1958391.
16
James E. Campbell, “Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections,” The Journal of Politics
47, no. 4 (November 1985): 1147, https://doi.org/10.2307/2130810.
17
Campbell, “Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections.”
18
James E. Campbell and Joe A. Sumners, “Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections,” American Political Science
Review 84, no. 2 (June 1990): 513–24, https://doi.org/10.2307/1963532.
19
Campbell, “Presidential Coattails and Midterm Losses in State Legislative Elections.”
20
Fullmer and Daniel, “Invisible Coattails,” 283.
12
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the opposition party is simply due to a “balancing” affect where voters support divided
government regardless of their approval of the president.21
A related theory is that the performance of the president’s party in non-presidential
elections is correlated with the performance of the economy.22 If the economy is perceived as
doing well, then voters are likely to reward the president whom they see as responsible for its
success and vice-versa. According to this theory, the president’s ability to impact the economy is
his most active tool in supporting the election of his co-partisans. Lastly, a president’s presence
in campaigning for his party’s candidates has been shown to have a positive impact in getting
those candidates elected.23 Therefore, a president can have agency by spending more of his time
on campaign appearances. Still others contend that it is a combination of these theories that
explains that impact of a president on his party’s midterm performance.24
Lastly, presidents function as party leader from the moment they are nominated through
their last day in office.25 As party leader, they are able to control and manipulate the party
organization by selecting their choice of national party chairman, who is “dutifully ratifie[d]” by
their party’s national convention.26 For the Democratic Party, this position is the Democratic
National Committee Chairman. By working alongside their chairmen, presidents are able to
direct fundraising and volunteer recruitment efforts,27 investment in both candidates and the

Joseph Bafumi, Robert S. Erikson, and Christopher Wlezien, “Balancing, Generic Polls and Midterm
Congressional Elections,” The Journal of Politics 72, no. 3 (July 2010): 705–19,
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381610000113.
22
Campbell, “Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections,” 1142; Tufte, “Determinants of
the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections,” 824.
23
Rob Mellen and Kathleen Searles, “Midterm Mobilization: The President As Campaigner-In-Chief During
Midterm House Elections, 1982-2006,” White House Studies 13, no. 2 (2013): 15.
24
Campbell, “Explaining Presidential Losses in Midterm Congressional Elections.”
25
Davis, The President as Party Leader, 27.
26
Davis, 98.
27
Elaine C Kamarck, “Assessing Howard Dean’s Fifty State Strategy and the 2006 Midterm Elections,” The Forum
4, no. 3 (January 18, 2006): 2–3, https://doi.org/10.2202/1540-8884.1141.
21
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party organization, and party messaging and candidate recruitment.28 Presidents function as the
public face of their party and “have a pervasive effect on popular opinion of and beliefs about
their parties.”29 As Neustadt wrote, “our national parties are confederations of state and local
party organizations, with a headquarters that represents the White House, more or less, if the
party has a President in office.”30
Scholarship on presidential party building finds that presidents choosing to actively build
up the party organization is not the same between parties. Galvin argues that while Republican
presidents seek to build up their party organization and brand, Democratic presidents work
“assiduously to personalize their parties” but take “few steps, if any, to leave behind a more
robust party organization able to persevere over the long term.”31 Galvin argues that in the search
for personally charismatic leaders, “Democrats neglected the less glamorous but ultimately more
important work of organization-building.”32 While charisma can lead to a president’s individual
success, focusing on the individual harms the party overall.
Due to this personality-driven approach to presidential campaigning, which traditionally
rejects the Democratic brand in favor of their personal brand, Democratic presidents have tended
to cannibalize the party infrastructure for their short-term success.33 Therefore, a president who

Daniel Galvin, “Changing Course: Reversing the Organizational Trajectory of the Democratic Party from Bill
Clinton to Barack Obama,” The Forum 6, no. 2 (2008): 7.
29
Jacobson, “How Presidents Shape Their Party’s Reputation and Prospects,” 26.
30
Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Power of Leadership.
31
Galvin, “Changing Course: Reversing the Organizational Trajectory of the Democratic Party from Bill Clinton to
Barack Obama,” 6.
32
Galvin, “Changing Course: Reversing the Organizational Trajectory of the Democratic Party from Bill Clinton to
Barack Obama.”
33
Daniel J. Galvin and Josh Vincent, “Democratic Presidents Have Traditionally Hurt Their Parties. Joe Biden May
Be Different.,” Washington Post, January 21, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/21/democratic-presidents-have-traditionally-hurt-their-partiesjoe-biden-may-be-different/; Robert Kuttner, “The Movement, the Party, and the President,” The American
Prospect, January 11, 2021, https://prospect.org/api/content/9f2c2208-536a-11eb-834d-1244d5f7c7c6/; Galvin,
“Changing Course: Reversing the Organizational Trajectory of the Democratic Party from Bill Clinton to Barack
Obama.”
28
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is less dependent on his personal brand may be more beneficial to the long-term success and
organizational health of his party.
In this thesis, I will follow the scholarship that suggests that presidents can have an
individualized impact on their own success and that that success can be divided into three types:
legislative, electoral, and party organizational. Presidents’ legislative success can be affected by
personal persuasion and by the presidents’ approval ratings. Presidents’ electoral success can be
affected by presidential visits and fundraising as well as the national political environment.
Lastly, as leader of the party, presidents are able to determine and affect the structure of their
party’s organization and thusly is responsible for it.

Methods
Due to the ongoing nature of Biden’s presidency, there is limited scholarship pertaining
to his leadership from which to draw. Therefore, in my analysis I will limit myself to sources and
data from only the first year of each of these presidencies: 1993 for Clinton, 2009 for Obama,

Figure 1.1
*1993 Senate balance was 59D-41R until Sen. Arlen Specter (PA) switched parties on
April 30th, 2009
**2009 Senate balance was 57D-43R until the June 5, 1993 election of Kay
Hutchinson (R-TX)
Source: https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm

Figure 1.2
Source: https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/74-Present/
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and 2021 for Biden. Fortunately for the applicability of this work, each of these years have many
commonalities in the nature of the federal government. Each of these data points began with a
federal Democratic trifecta, although the exact make-up of Congress was slightly different
(Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2), each of these years occurred during a period of heightened
unemployment due to either an ongoing recession (2007-08 Financial Crisis, 2020-2021
Coronavirus Pandemic) or in the immediate aftermath of one (1990-1992 Recession), and each
of years coincided with majority Republican-appointed Supreme Court.
Figure 1.3

In this thesis, I assess legislative success through each president’s ability to enact their
legislative agenda while accounting for the varying ideological and partisan composition of
Congress, specifically through the first stimulus bill that each president pursued. I intend to
measure electoral success through the performance of Democratic candidates in off-year races,
most notably the Gubernatorial and state legislative elections of New Jersey and Virginia, as well
as the qualitative assessment of the president’s campaign appearances in support of Democratic
candidates. These gubernatorial elections serve as an effective predictor of Midterm Democratic
House Vote Share for both states when considering elections over the past 30 years with Rsquared values of > .3 and R-squared values of > .75 when not counting 2001, a year widely
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considered an outlier in American electoral history to the outsized impact of the September 11th
attacks. Additionally, they are the only elections that routinely occur in the off years that I can
access for the purpose of this thesis. However, since they have proven to be predictive, they
effectively serve the intended purpose. Lastly, since these elections are the only statewide
elections held in these years, they can monopolize the president’s and the party’s political time,
making the qualitative analysis simpler and more concentrated.
Lastly, I intend to gauge the political health of the Democratic Party through the
quantitative measurement of the president’s fundraising for the Democratic National Committee
(DNC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), as well as the qualitative measurement of insider and
media assessment of the party organization.
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Chapter Outline
This thesis is centered on the hypothesis that extensive Washington experience bestows
intangible benefits upon a president that makes him a more effective party leader and chief
legislator. In this thesis, I use Presidents Clinton, Obama, and Biden to test this hypothesis
through the measurements of electoral, legislative, and party organizational success. According
to my hypothesis, President Biden should be notably more successful than his two predecessors
due to his extensive experience in Washington.
Chapter two examines the backgrounds, temperaments, and biographies of the presidents
prior to their time serving in the White House. In doing so, it will look specifically at the prior
political experience and connections of these men, previewing how these experiences shifted
their viewpoints and shaped their approach to the presidency. Chapter three tests the presidents’
electoral success through the off year gubernatorial elections in Virginia and New Jersey as well
as the Democrats’ performance in off year special elections. Chapter four analyzes the
presidents’ legislative success, looking specifically at economic stimulus legislation pushed by
the White House in the president’s first year in office. It will compare the presidents’
congressional majorities and legislative strategies to the end result of the legislation that was
passed into law. Chapter five looks at the presidents’ impact on the Democratic Party’s
organization, specifically analyzing fundraising for the party’s national committees, the
presidents’ involvement with the formal party structure, and the presidents’ dedication to
building that organization. Finally, chapter six concludes the thesis and compares the results of
chapters three, four, and five to my hypothesis.
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Chapter 2: Presidential Backgrounds and Personalities
In order to understand the context of the three presidents and presidencies discussed in
this thesis, this chapter will provide a background of the political experiences and the
personalities of Presidents Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden. In this section, I use the
presidents’ autobiographies,34 contemporary reporting in the form of books, and reporting in
mainstream press sources to form my understanding of these men. While not comprehensive, as
this is not a thesis in political history, it is the aim of this chapter to present a basic understanding
of the men that are being analyzed to those who are less familiar with them.

Bill Clinton
William Jefferson “Bill” Clinton III was born on August 19th, 1946, in Hope, Arkansas.
He was born to a widowed mother.35 In his childhood, he was raised his grandparents, who “ran
a little grocery store”36 where they gladly lent to Black customers even in a segregated South.
Later, his mother would remarry “the owner of the local Buick dealership, Roger Clinton”37 a
man who would later be physically abusive with Clinton and his mother. Despite his
grandparents’ racially progressive nature, Clinton writes that his “family was not especially
political.”38
After graduating from high school, Clinton attended Georgetown University’s School of
Foreign Service where he received a B.S. in Foreign Service. He then received a Rhodes

At the time of writing, Joe Biden’s presidency is still ongoing and thus he has not written a memoir of his time in
the White House. Instead, I use his most recent book Promise Me, Dad as a window into his experience in the Vice
Presidency and his personality.
35
Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Knopf, 2004), 1.
36
Clinton, 11.
37
Clinton, 17.
38
Clinton, 37.
34
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Scholarship to Oxford University where he studied for a year before attending and graduating
from Yale Law School.39 Without exception, these institutions are some of the most prestigious
and academically rigorous in the world. Although his background was not one of privilege, his
education certainly was. This background is one that – rightly – made Clinton proud of his
intellect. However later during Clinton’s presidential transition, this characteristic would affect
his team’s effectiveness:

“The meeting could easily degenerate into one of the endless, rambling, policy seminars
that Clinton loved. [Director of the National Economic Council Robert] Rubin didn’t
want to presume to chair a meeting Clinton might want to lead, but he felt the
proceedings would need a focus and crispness.”40

This intellectual banter found in Clinton’s background would grow into a potential for
cacophony in his White House, a place where effectiveness is frequently closely related to
decisiveness. This would prove to be a challenge for his staff when considering the type of
economic plan to put forward:

“Campaign aides had told [Director of the Office of Management and Budget Leon
Panetta] that Clinton was deadly slow to make the decisions. ‘The worst thing about him

39
40

Clinton, 178.
Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 81.
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is that he never makes a decision,’ [Senior Policy Advisor George] Stephanopoulos had
said. ‘He’s not going to give you an answer.’”41

Only one year after graduating from Yale Law School, Clinton returned to Arkansas and
ran for Congress in the 3rd Congressional District. Although he lost by four points, this would not
dissuade him from continuing an ambitious career in politics. In 1976, he ran for Attorney
General of Arkansas and encountered only minimal opposition before winning the office. Two
years later, he would be elected Governor of Arkansas. From there, he would experience a
tumultuous political career, losing the Governor’s Mansion in 1980, but then winning it back in
1982 and holding the office for the next ten years. While this would give Clinton significant
governing experience, it would entirely revolve around state-level politics in Arkansas. As
Woodward wrote of the Clinton Presidential Transition:

“Clinton had dominated [Arkansas] politically for the last decade, running it largely with
a Rolodex of 100 important telephone numbers. Now he had 78 days before he would be
running the biggest operation in the world, headquartered in the alien culture of
Washington. He plunged into the transition, the uncomfortable interlude of neither
campaigning nor governing.”42

41
42

Woodward, 86.
Woodward, 59.
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Although he had become a national figure through his work on education and his work on
the moderate Democratic Leadership Council (DLC),43 he had not served in federal elected
office before he took the presidential oath of office on January 20, 1993. However, as a member
of the DLC, Clinton was predisposed towards an attitude of compromise and bipartisanship
which he described as:

“We believed in keeping the American dream alive for all people. We believed in
government, though not in the status quo. And we believed government was spending too
much on yesterday – interest on debt, defense, more money for the same health care –
and too little on tomorrow: education, the environment, research and development, the
infrastructure. I said the DLC stood for a modern mainstream agenda: the expansion of
opportunity not bureaucracy; choice in public schools and childcare; responsibility and
empowerment for poor people; and reinventing government, away from the top-down
bureaucracy of the industrial era to a leaner, more flexible, more innovative model
appropriate for the modern global economy.”44

However, this is a more progressive framing of the work of the DLC, with Clinton also
writing that

43
44

Clinton, My Life, 361.
Clinton, 361.
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“[the DLC] had issued a statement on principles intended to move beyond the tired
partisan debate in Washington by creating a dynamic but centrist progressive movement
of new ideas rooted in traditional American values.”45

When talking about a potential middle class family tax cut, Clinton chose to compromise
with himself, described by Woodward as “the ideal Clintonian solution – down the middle and
offering a choice.”46 From the evidence presented, President Clinton was a man who believed in
the politics of compromise and moderation, and aspired to intellectual debate over efficiency.

Barack Obama
Barack Hussain Obama was born on August 4, 1961, in Honolulu, Hawai’i.47 He was
raised by a single mother, Anne Durham, who was heavily involved in politics and “full of
strong opinions,”48 in Obama’s words, “in my mother’s world, the personal really was
political.”49 After high school, Obama attended Occidental College, where he studied political
thinkers50 as well as led a campus protest against apartheid.51 After two years, Obama transferred
to Columbia University where he majored in political science.52 He describes his experience at
Columbia as “holed up in a series of dilapidated apartments, largely shorn of old friends and bad

45

Clinton, 364–65.
Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House, 42.
47
Barack Obama, A Promised Land, 1st ed. (Germany: Crown, 2020), 6.
48
Obama, 6.
49
Obama, 7.
50
Obama, 9.
51
Peter Kunhardt, Part 1, Documentary Episode, Obama: In Pursuit of a More Perfect Union (HBO Studios, 2021).
52
Obama, A Promised Land, 11.
46
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habits, I lived like a monk – reading, writing, filling up journals, rarely bothering with college
parties or even hot meals. I got lost in my head.”53
Obama’s youth was one of attending private schools and engaging in an excess of
intellectualism. This cerebralism would continue to be a trademark aspect of Obama’s
personality and political style. While a wide range of knowledge and curiosity is an asset for the
Commander-in-Chief, it would occasionally present as a political liability in his dealings with
Congress. Years later, a Politico article contrasting Obama and Biden articulated this aspect of
Obama’s personality, saying he “and his closest allies seemed unaware of how he would alienate
potential allies with his preachy tone, particularly in Congress.”54 The same article describes
Obama as “very disciplined and cerebral” and reported that “[r]epublicans who negotiated with
the [Obama] administration often came away finding Obama condescending.”55 For example,
when negotiating with then-House Minority Whip Eric Cantor about the 2009 American
Reinvestment and Recovery Act, Obama’s demeanor irked Cantor, with him “resent[ing]
Obama’s presumption that he knew what Republicans wanted, and what their priorities were,
without consulting them.”56 In The Price of Politics, journalist Bob Woodward wrote

“Cantor might have admired Obama’s self-assuredness – the confidence, the smooth
articulation and eloquence – but the president had taken it too far, to the point of
‘arrogance.’ Obama had demonstrated that he didn’t need any other input.”57

53

Obama, 11.
Alex Thompson, “‘The President Was Not Encouraging’: What Obama Really Thought About Biden,”
POLITICO, August 14, 2020, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/08/14/obama-biden-relationship393570.
55
Thompson.
56
Bob Woodward, The Price of Politics (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 17.
57
Woodward, 21-22.
54
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Obama’s experience in elected office began in 1994 with a run for the Illinois State
Senate on the South Side of Chicago.58 In his first race, he utilized Illinois’s antiquated rules on
petition signatures to knock his most serious opponents off the ballot although he was initially
hesitant to do so. From that experience he says that he “learned to respect the nuts and bolts of
politics, the attention to detail required, the daily grind that might prove the difference between
winning and losing.”59 However, he never seemed comfortable with the realities of politics. In
his memoir, Obama writes “…I had become the very thing that, as a younger man, I had warned
myself against. I had become a politician.”60 The clear negative connotation that Obama has
towards politicians and the profession of politics at-large carries through his work.
After eight years in the Illinois State Senate, Obama ran for, and won, a seat in the U.S.
Senate. Despite his victory, he almost immediately found a distaste for the slow, methodical
movement of Senatorial procedure.61 Although he worked to dissuade the rumors, his team
quickly began to plan for a potential presidential run in 2008. By the time that he announced his
run for president in February 2007, he had been a United States Senator for just over two years.
It is difficult to say that Obama had much, if any, significant experience in Washington by the
time he ran for president. This skepticism of Washington and the Democratic Party at-large is
also seen in Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign. His message of “change” was persuasive for
many Americans, but it also ignored the realities of a polarized and partisan Congress that

58

Obama, A Promised Land, 30.
Obama, 30.
60
Obama, 38.
61
David Axelrod, Believer: My Forty Years in Politics (Penguin Books, 2016).
59

McJessy 19
President Obama would have to work with. In Obama’s famed 2004 Democratic National
Convention speech that catapulted him to national prominence, he famously said

“There are those who are preparing to divide us, the spin masters, the negative ad
peddlers who embrace the politics of anything goes. Well, I say to them tonight, there is
not a liberal America and a conservative America — there is the United States of
America.”62

While Obama now says that these words were aspirational, they reflected a deep mistrust of the
climate in Washington, D.C. – an underlying belief that both parties were in on the take, that
both congressional Democrats and congressional Republicans were at fault for the dysfunctional
state of our federal government and body politic. This approach would lead Obama to naively
approach his presidency and hamper his success.

Joe Biden
Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. was born in Scranton, Pennsylvania in 1942. At ten years old,
his family would move to Delaware for his father to find work. He would describe this
experience and move as one of the defining moments of his life and one of the primary shapers
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of his world view.63 Biden would later attend two public schools in his pursuit of higher
education receiving a Bachelor of Arts in History and Political Science from the University of
Delaware and a Juris Doctor from Syracuse University.64 When elected president, Biden would
be the first president to graduate from a public university in nearly fifty years. Some write that
this made Biden “seem defensive about his intellectual bona fides,”65 but it also gave him a more
commonplace perspective of the world.
At 28, Biden would run for, and win, a seat on the New Castle County Council. Only two
years later, Biden would challenge Republican Senator J. Caleb Boggs in the race for U.S.
Senate. He won the race by only one percent, holding the seat that would be his for the next 36
years. Tragically, only weeks after winning the election, his family was struck by truck, killing
his wife and daughter. This tragedy would define Biden and his brand of empathy that is key to
understanding his personality.66
In the Senate, Biden would establish himself as a consummate gladhander, someone who
was friendly – perhaps too friendly, as in the case of his relationships with famed segregationists
– with everyone, regardless of their party or politics.67 Although comfortable in the Senate,
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Biden would also travel home each night to his home in Delaware, which he credits to keeping
him grounded.68

However, Biden was not reluctant to engage in partisan politics when necessary. In 1988,
as Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Biden would lead the opposition that
eventually killed Robert Bork’s nomination to the Supreme Court on ideological grounds,
breaking decades of precedent that had had the Senate defer to the president’s choice of nominee
excepting a large scandal. His strategy in the defeating the nomination was described in an
Atlantic article:
“To prepare, Biden plowed through Bork’s writings and held mock hearings during
which he tried out various lines of attack. Tribe and others played the part of Bork. Aides
videotaped the sessions, and Biden played the tapes for his wife and sons, looking for
feedback. Biden hit upon a strategy: He would focus on Bork’s view that the Constitution
did not hold a general right to privacy, an issue that people who would be watching on
television could immediately grasp…
Biden confronted Bork in a matter-of-fact tone, patiently asking him to explain his
reasoning that the [Griswold v. Connecticut] decision was flawed. His mien was earnest,
searching. At no point was he scornful. Days of study paid off. Walking the onetime
professor through the Griswold case, Biden teased out that Bork would have left it to
state legislatures to decide whether a married couple was free to use birth control.”69
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This would inform Biden’s approach to politics; it is necessary to tackle a situation in the manner
that wins the day and is the simplest to communicate to people. Intellectual insight is important
to prove competence and respect, but it is necessary to communicate in a language that is
understood and understandable.
During Biden’s lengthy time in the Senate, he would also notch a number of significant
legislative accomplishments. When debating the nature of a COVID relief package with
Republicans, Biden’s understanding of the legislative process would come out:

“Biden had learned over the decades that meetings – particularly long meetings could be
useful to move people off their talking points. Most senators only knew the short version
of proposed legislation, which could run hundreds of pages. A long discussion might
eventually open some areas for compromise. But it took time.”70

His understanding that brevity can lead to decisiveness contrasts against Clinton’s tendency to
allow and enjoy extended debate and compromise. During the Obama presidency, then-Vice
President Biden would frequently be sent to Capitol Hill as the emissary of the White House with
President Obama praising Biden’s “Senate experience and legislative acumen.”71 In this role, he
would successfully convince Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) to switch his party affiliation,72
negotiate a resolution to the 2010 Bush tax credit standoff,73 and the 2011 Debt Ceiling Stand-
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off. Later, White House Chief of Staff Ron Klain explained Biden’s approach in these situations
to Woodward:

“Klain saw Biden did not have some special way of persuading McConnell, no magic
power as the ‘McConnell whisperer,’ as some called Biden during the Obama years. But
he did know how to negotiate with McConnell.
‘For example,’ Klain once said, ‘you’re not going to persuade Mitch McConnell that he’s
wrong about the estate tax. That he didn’t have the right class at the Kennedy School to
explain to him the regressive nature. That’s not what Joe Biden tries to do. He’s like
‘Okay, you tell me what you need to get this done. I’ll tell you what I need.’’”74

Simply put, Biden’s approach to political negotiating is one of realism. To Biden, horse
trading and political pressure is an expected and understood part of the political negotiating
process. Bipartisanship is ideal to Biden, but not a requirement for successful legislating. When
speaking to West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin about getting his American Rescue Plan Act
through the Senate, he said:

“Joe, Biden said, I’ve lived through these situations and I’m trying to work through this. I
prefer the bipartisan path, but that takes time. Unfortunately, we don’t have time here
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because of the pandemic and the economy. There was a deadline ahead, March 14, when
supplemental unemployment benefits would begin to lapse.”75

Biden is a man of significant Washington experience. His approach to politics is shaped
by the years of legislative and political battles that he experienced during his time in the Senate.
Additionally, he is a much older man at the time of his assuming the presidency than either
Clinton or Obama was. This gives him an added perspective, having seen numerous presidents
operate up close.

Conclusion
Biden has significant Senatorial and Washington experience, making him the first Democratic
president elected with such experience since President Lyndon B. Johnson. This experience has
informed Biden’s worldview and his approach to his presidency. I hypothesize that this
experience will lead to a more successful presidency than those experienced by either President
Obama or Clinton.
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Chapter 3: Electoral Success
This chapter evaluates the electoral success of Presidents Clinton, Obama, and Biden.
One of the main goals of the Democratic Party is to hold power. Therefore, as party leader it is
important that the president is able to marshal his party to electoral victories. The president’s
ability to elect his co-partisans is both his responsibility and a reflection of his political strength.
To measure the electoral success of each president, I compared elections in the
presidents’ first years of their presidencies. Although midterm performances are traditionally
used as a measurement of the president’s party’s strength, the 2022 midterms under President
Biden are not available at the time of writing. Future research could use midterm data to extend
the analysis done in this chapter. Therefore, this chapter uses the following elections to measure
presidential electoral success: the New Jersey and Virginia Gubernatorial races, the New Jersey
State Senate races, the Virginia House of Delegates races, and Congressional special elections.
New Jersey and Virginia are the two states that hold elections in the off-year and thus work well
to have consistent and comparable data. As statewide races, the gubernatorial elections have the
largest and most consistent electorates. Fullmer and Daniel also establish the importance of
presidents on these elections writing “it is apparent that presidential approval plays a modest, but
significant, role in gubernatorial elections.”76 Therefore, these elections provide a window into
the president’s ability to influence the electorate while in office.
The New Jersey State Senate was chosen given that it is up for election every off-year
and uses single member districts, making comparisons simpler. The Virginia House of Delegates
was chosen for the same reason. The New Jersey General Assembly uses multimember districts
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which makes comparisons much more confounding while the Virginia Senate is only up for
election the year before presidential elections. The impact of presidents on state legislative races
has also been established in existing research.77 Although both states have become more
Democratic leaning over the past twenty years, shifts in voting patterns can still be revealing. To
account for this shift in partisanship, I calculated the change in each election as compared to the
same election four years previous in 1989, 2005, and 2017. In the state legislative elections, I
then averaged the change across the entire chamber. Fortunately for the sake of comparison,
Republicans held the White House in each of those previous years making comparisons more
congruent.
Given that the president’s party usually experiences a negative coattails effect, a decline
in the Democratic vote share is expected.78 However, a more electorally successful president
may be able to mitigate this fall-off to an extent. If Biden’s status as a president with extensive
Washington experience made him a more electorally successful president, one would expect
better electoral results for Biden as compared to Clinton and Obama. However, confounding
variables may be at work. First, candidate quality does affect the performance of said
candidate.79 Second, it is possible that the political environment at the time of election has an
effect on the party’s performance independent of the president’s influence. Lastly, it is possible
that a declining shift is due to shifting partisanship of the states’ overall rather than a reflection
of the president.
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Data
Data for this section was compiled by the author through using numerous online sources
including the New Jersey and Virginia State Boards of Election, Ballotpedia, and a large existing
dataset of state legislative results compiled by Klarner et al.80

Gubernatorial Elections
Figure 3.1
Election Year - Previous Year NJ Gov Dem Change

VA Dem Gov Change

1993 – 1989

-12.94

-9.24

2009 – 2005

-8.59

-10.47

2021 – 2017

-4.81

-3.31

In comparing the gubernatorial elections, I took the percentage earned of the Democratic
candidates in the year after the Democratic president was elected and subtracted the percentage
of the Democratic candidate from four years prior. In doing so, we find that the Democratic vote
shared declined in each of the years sampled. However, there is a roughly six percent difference
between Biden’s shift and the previous two. This would suggest that Biden had a smaller
blowback in the gubernatorial races. Additionally, the only Democratic candidate who won in
1993, 2009, or 2021 was New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy, who barely won re-election in
2021. Again, this supports Biden’s role as a more electorally successful president.
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Change in State Legislative Races
Figure 3.2
Election Year - Previous Year NJ State Senate Dem Change

VA Dem HoD Change

1993 – 1989

-8.631015675

-8.88743296

2009 – 2005

-7.0765631

1.9086999

2021 – 2017

-6.687832328

-7.648757447

The state legislative results from Virginia and New Jersey show a usual six to eight
percent fall off between years. The standout exception is the shift in the Virginia House of
Delegates from 2005 to 2009 where Democrats gained about an average of two percent.
However, aside from this difference there is no clear pattern in electoral shifts. If Biden were
significantly impacting the electoral prospects of these legislative chambers, one would expect a
favorable shift towards Democrats during his presidency. No such shift exists in Figure 3.2. It is
also worth noting that the averages in Figure 3.2 may be affected by races where one party does
not field a candidate, but these are about even across parties and should have a limited impact
across a large sample size.
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Change in Congressional Specials
Figure 3.3
D-Vote Diff
Date

State

District

(1993-1992)

5/4/1993

WI

1

-7.70%

4/13/1993

MISS

2

-22.80%

6/8/1993

CA

17

-19.70%

5/4/1993

OH

2

0.00%

12/7/1993

MI

3

-15.00%

6/8/1993

TX

Statewide

-7.30%

Average
Change

-12.08%

D-Vote Diff
(2009-2008)
**Given that
NY allows
candidates to
run under
several
parties, I
have totaled
3/31/2009

NY

20

-2.90%

all votes for a
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candidate and
placed that
value under
their main
party
4/4/2009

IL

5

-4.70%
**This race
was
unopposed in

7/14/2009

CA

32

-38.10%

11/3/2009

CA

10

-12.30%

2008

**This race
is unique
given that a
candidate on
the
Conservative
ballot line,
Doug
Hoffman,
received
45.98% of
9/21/2009

NY

23

13.60%

the vote
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Average
Change

-8.88%
D-Vote Diff
(2021-2020)
**Given that
in the 2020
Election 2
Republicans
made the
runoff, prior
numbers are
made through
addition of
partyaffiliated
candidates in
the primary.
Likewise for

3/20/2021

LA

5

-4.9%

2021
**Given that
in the 2020

3/20/2021

LA

2

8.3%

Election 2
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Democrats
made the
runoff, 2021
numbers are
made through
addition of
partyaffiliated
candidates in
the primary.
Likewise in
2020
6/1/2021

NM

1

2.1%
**Given that
in the 2021
special
election two
Republicans
made the
runoff, 2021
jungle

5/1/2021

TX

6

-6.7%

primary
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numbers are
used
11/2/2021

OH

11

-1.3%

11/2/2021

OH

15

5.1%

Average
Change

0.4%

Due to the nature of Congressional elections, there is a limited sample size to pull from
for this section of analysis. However, there are a few takeaways from this data. First, there seems
to be a reliable fall-off in the off year. This is consistent with the reverse effect that existing
scholarship suggests occurs to the party that controls the White House.81 Second, there does
seem to be a slightly less severe swing during the Biden presidency than the Clinton or Obama
presidencies. This may be due to President Biden’s presence in the White House, but it also may
be attributed to the decreasing elasticity of federal elections in the United States.82 The seats
contested in these special elections are also not uniformly safe or competitive seats for either
party and therefore do represent a cross-section of congressional seats.

Media Analysis and Presidential Visits
In addition to the election results, the perception of a president’s performance and
political strength are also important in assessing the electoral performance of the president. In
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1993, Virginia voters were deeply dissatisfied with President Clinton’s performance, with only
one in three voters expressing their approval of him. A New York Times article describes the
impact of this polling on the campaign, saying that Virginia Gubernatorial Nominee Attorney
General Mary Sue Terry “steered well clear of asking Mr. Clinton to campaign for her.”83
However in New Jersey, Clinton “plunged heavily onto the [Democratic Governor Jim] Florio
campaign, run by his own campaign strategist, James Carville.84 The Washington Post described
this loss as “ominous” and said that Clinton’s leadership was a contributing factor in the loss of
special Senate elections in Georgia and Texas. The same article said:

“Clinton has never enjoyed much leverage with Congress, and after Tuesday, he
has less. His approval rating in current polls is hovering at just about the same 43
percent level that his vote was a year ago. There is no "fear factor" to inhibit
members from crossing him -- and perhaps some incentive even for Democrats to
distance themselves. The same senior White House official was peddling the line
Monday that a Florio victory and a defeat for Mary Sue Terry, the Democrat who
shunned Clinton in Virginia, would show that "Democrats are better off sticking
with the president." They weren't.”85
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The media’s reporting on Clinton after the November 1993 elections suggest not only that
Clinton was unhelpful on the campaign trail, but that the losses contributed to a fall in his
political capital with Congress. This implies that Clinton’s first year led to an electorally
weak president.

In 2009, the gubernatorial results sent a more mixed message. Before the election,
President Obama held a 57% approval rating in New Jersey, leading Roll Call to conclude that
Democratic Governor Jon Corzine’s narrow loss was due to his mismanagement of the budget.
Additionally, in Virginia, 20% of voters who approved of Obama voted for the Republican
nominee for Governor.86 Finally, in a competitive Congressional special election held the same
evening in New York, the Democratic candidate eked out a 4-percent victory, contradicting the
idea of a drag on all Democratic candidates. In sum, Roll Call writes “[t]he argument that each
gubernatorial contest was simply a referendum on the president’s performance simply doesn’t
hold water.” Therefore, it is not clear that Obama had a negative effect on his party’s
performance.

Additionally, President Obama did campaign in both Virginia and New Jersey, signaling
an openness from the candidates to the president’s support.87 This shows that they did not view
his presence as a vulnerability as Attorney General Terry had seen Clinton’s. However, there was
a drop-off in enthusiasm for the Democratic candidates for Governor from the prior year’s
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victories for Obama.8889 This suggests that Obama held some unique appeal to voters that did not
trickle down to his party at-large. This contrasts to Clinton who found that he held roughly the
same level of support as his partisans and that he had held during his presidential election.90
Overall, given the conditions of the elections held in November 2009, especially the president’s
approval ratings and the overall mixed outcome, the president’s political capital did not appear to
be as damaged as Clinton’s following the elections.

Finally, the 2021 elections appeared to reflect more of the message seen in 2009 than
1993. President Biden made several campaign appearances in Virginia, including one less than a
week before the election. Although reports said that the Democratic nominee Terry McAuliffe
“distanced” himself from the White House, the president and his vice president both made
several stops in the state leading up to election day, showcasing a level of influence by both
elected officials.91 In New Jersey, Biden was also welcome, visiting the state to endorse New
Jersey Governor Phil Murphy as well as sell his dual infrastructure and social spending bills.92
By including the president’s legislative agenda in his endorsement for the governor, one sees that
he did not view his work in Congress as a potential weakness as Obamacare and the Clinton
Healthcare plans had been. As opposed to the large voter fall-off that was seen in 2009 when
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President Obama was not on the ticket, the 2021 elections saw increased levels of turnout for
members of both parties.93

Most striking, however, is that following the underwhelming results for Democrats on
election day, with a narrow loss in Virginia and a narrow victory in New Jersey, two states that
by 2021 had voted for Biden by double digits, the media narrative shifted towards arguing that
Democrats may have been hurt by a failure to pass more legislation, not by a backlash to already
passed legislation.94 Indeed, only twelve days after the elections, Biden’s landmark Bipartisan
Infrastructure Bill was signed into law after being held up in the House of Representatives for
months.95 This suggests a political deftness on behalf of the Biden White House, parlaying two
defeats for the party electorally into larger legislative victories.

Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter on the electoral success of Presidents Clinton,
Obama, and Biden does not suggest a clear outcome. While the numerical shifts of the off-year
elections have softened slightly over the years to be more favorable, or perhaps more accurately
less unfavorable, to Democrats, it is not indisputable that this is due to the occupant of the White
House. If this were the case, it would be more likely that Clinton and Obama would have similar
percent changes with a large change for Biden. Notably, this is seen in the gubernatorial results,
which show a steep drop-off in percent lost for Biden. In the Congressional special elections, a
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similar phenomenon is seen, with twelve and eight percent losses for Clinton and Obama,
respectively, while only a .4 percent loss for Biden. However, contrasting this, for the legislative
election for each president, there is a roughly one percent drop-off in Democratic vote share. The
quantitative analysis suggests that Biden may have had a less intense backlash to his presidency
and exhibited some electoral success in that role, but it is also possible that this is in-part due to
the increasing polarization of American politics along with the increasing Democratic-leaning
nature of the states utilized. For further information, the 2022 midterm elections should serve as
a more consequential dataset.

Lastly, the media analysis does suggest that Biden managed to bear the brunt of the
election losses better than Clinton or Obama. The strongest evidence for this is the passage and
subsequent signing of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Act less than two weeks after the election.
While the election defeats hobbled Clinton and Obama’s legislative agendas, it did not seem to
do the same to Biden. Also, Biden’s presence in both contested states, not as an individual star as
in the case of Obama, but as an avatar of the Democratic party, suggests he has a sustained
political strength among the electorate – even if it did not lead to a Democrat sweep of the
elections.
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Chapter 4: Legislative Success
The second measure of presidential success in this project is the president’s ability to
accomplish his legislative agenda. During their campaigns, presidential candidates run on a set of
policies and legislation they wish to accomplish if elected. Once elected, the mandate and bully
pulpit of the president causes their agenda to become the agenda of their federal party. As one of
the main goals of political parties is to pass policy, whether policy is passed in the form the
president wishes is a vital measure of presidential success. The president is presumed to be able
to persuade Congress, particularly a Congress of his co-partisans, to pass legislation as closely to
his request as possible. This chapter does not measure the efficacy or quality of the economic
proposals, but rather the presidents’ effectiveness in passing them through Congress. This
chapter also touches on the presidents’ other legislative accomplishments during their first years
in office.
For the purpose of this thesis, this chapter examines in-depth the first stimulus plans of
Presidents Clinton, Obama, and Biden during each of their first years in office. Each president
assumed office with the intention to address the economic situation in the United States. Clinton
faced increased deficits and a stalled economy that he sought to activate through legislative
action. Obama assumed office during the Great Recession that had stemmed from the 2007-2008
Financial Crash. Biden took office during the COVID-19 pandemic and faced an economy that
was struggling to recover from the impacts of the pandemic.
Each president crafted a bill intended to address the economic difficulties they inherited.
For President Clinton, this bill was the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1993, or
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the Short-term Stimulus.96 For President Obama, this bill was the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).97 For President Biden, this bill was the American Rescue
Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA).98
To measure the successfulness of these pieces of legislation, I looked at several objective
statistics seen in the chart below. The first statistic is the number of votes won from each caucus
and conference (House Democrats, House Republicans, Senate Democrats, Senate Republicans)
out of the number of members of that caucus, under the assumption that all presidents would
prefer a larger amount of support for their bill. The second statistic is the date that the legislation
was signed. Given that each of these bills were meant to respond to an economic downturn, an
earlier passage is preferred. The third item is whether the bill was passed through the process of
reconciliation, which is a legislative maneuver that allows Congress to bypass the 60-vote
filibuster process. This is a tool that demonstrates a familiarity and shrewdness with the
legislative process. Finally, the last statistic is the amount of funding that the bill included
compared to the amount of funding that the president had initially desired. A president is more
successful if he can persuade Congress to allocate the full amount of funding that he wanted.
Figure 4.1
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House Reps
Yes/Total
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0/43
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Reconciliation?
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Overview
Several aspects of Figure 4.1 stand out. First, Clinton and Obama were operating with
much larger majorities in both chambers of Congress than Biden. This allowed them larger
margins of error in order for them to still pass their legislative agendas.
Second, only one president, Obama, got any Republican buy-in for their stimulus plan.
While many pundits find bipartisanship to be an inherent good whose presence benefits all
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legislation,102 this is not by any means a closed debate.103 While it should be noted, it is not
considered an inarguable good for the purpose of this thesis.
Third, Biden notably got the highest percentage of his desired stimulus despite the close
margins in Congress. As legislator in chief, a president aims to achieve as much as his desired
agenda as possible. Therefore, Biden’s accomplishment is notable for the purpose of this chapter.
Fourth, Biden is the only president of the three that elected to use the Budget
Reconciliation process for the purpose of their stimulus. The Budget Reconciliation process is a
legislative maneuver that allows lawmakers to make fiscal and budgetary changes once during
each fiscal year through only a simple majority in the Senate. This allows the Senate to
circumvent the filibuster, which is another Senate rule requiring 60-votes to end debate on a
bill.104 The choice to use this legislative maneuver is a conscious one by the president to
accomplish their goals.
Lastly, there is a clear differentiation between when each president signed their stimulus
bill into law. Obama signed his bill into law in 29 days, Biden in 51 days, and Clinton in 94 days.
The speed at which a bill becomes law is a fair measure of its success, and therefore impacts a
president’s legislative success.
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Clinton and the Short-Term Stimulus

Clinton began his presidency with his sights set on a dual track economic plan. First, he
sought to pass a short-term stimulus to invigorate a stagnant American economy. Second, he
sought to rework the American tax code and federal spending to cut the federal deficit, which
was a priority of both Congress and economists, while also aiding middle-class Americans.105
The details of these plans shifted heavily over the course of the 1992 presidential
election. However, on February 18, 1993, Clinton solidified the many debates among his
advisers into an address to a Joint Session of Congress. The plan was outlined in The Washington
Post:

“The package features a four-year, $493 billion plan evenly divided between tax
increases and spending cuts, including a freeze on the pay of federal workers next year
and lower raises than scheduled in the following years…
Two-thirds of the money is to go to deficit reduction – bringing the deficit in 1997 down
$140 billion from current projections – and the rest to about $160 billion in new spending
that Clinton describes as investment. Clinton also is calling for an immediate $30 billion
stimulus program to help create jobs in the short run.”106

The deficit reduction targets in this outline were already significantly lower than those
that the Clinton economic team had originally targeted during the campaign “$240 billion, $220
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billion, or $195 billion.”107 This change is due to the warring sides of Clinton’s economic staff.
As described in The Agenda by Bob Woodward, each of the members of his staff had their own
agendas, ranging from Vice President’s Al Gore’s focus on an energy tax, to Labor Secretary
Robert Reich’s expansionary fiscal policy, to Office of Management and Budget Chairman Leon
Panetta’s deficit reduction. While having many experts in disagreement is not unusual, in this
case it led to excessive conflict over policy and strategy.
The first aspect of Clinton’s plan, the short-term stimulus plan, immediately ran into
difficulty in Congress. Clinton quickly readjusted his targeted amount to “$16 billion of quick
spending.”108 Clinton did not want to “start talking compromise and be seen as wavering right
out of the box.”109 This led to a number of conservative Democrats in the House voting against
the stimulus. Although the House did pass the “unadulterated,” bill it quickly ran into difficulties
in the Senate.110 Republicans, frustrated by the “strong-arm” tactics of the Democratic Senate
Majority Leader Robert Byrd, began a filibuster of the stimulus bill. Democrats proved unable to
get three Republicans to join them in breaking the filibuster, leading Panetta to attribute the

“problems to a dual failure: no effective message operation to counter Republican
charges, and no backup plan to keep the package moving. Success in these situations
required movement. Clinton’s economic plan seemed stalled. Clinton had run into two
old, unsettled pieces of business in Senate politics: Byrd’s old-baron style and Dole’s to
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prove he was the party leader who could hold the various Republican factions under one
tent.”111

Clinton’s unfamiliarity with Congress and the Senate led him to hit a wall in terms of influence
in the chamber. As Woodward writes

“once the plan moved outside the Roosevelt Room over to Capitol Hill, it was out of
Clinton’s hands. Congress had subjected it to its own process. Multiple committees,
powerful personalities, special relationships, and special interests the White House didn’t
understand took over.”112

Despite having two experienced Finance Chairmen in both his Budget Director and
Treasury Secretary, the president’s own inexperience made him unable to succeed. Unable to
break the Republican filibuster, Clinton eventually capitulated on his $16 billion plan and instead
only signed into law a $4 billion expansion of unemployment insurance – a major defeat for the
White House.
The larger part of Clinton’s economic plan eventually passed through Congress in August
1993. The new portion of the plan was eventually hollowed out, with a focus only on deficit
reduction through new taxes and reduced spending that passed with a bare minimum of 219
votes in the House and 50 in the Senate. The deficit reduction amount was increased, the energy
tax to combat climate change had been transformed into a 7-cent gas tax, then a 4.7-cent gas tax,
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and “they had effectively wound up with an anti-stimulus package in a weak economy.”113
Clinton’s inexperience with Congress and Washington directly caused the collapse of his
economic legislative agenda.
During 1993, Clinton achieved several other major legislative accomplishments,
including the AmeriCorps program, the Brady Bill, and most notably NAFTA. However, each of
these bills was welcomed in Congress, and Clinton’s signature issue, healthcare reform, failed to
ever pass Congress. Despite the experience of his staff, Clinton’s limited familiarity with
Congress proved a weakness in accomplishing his economic agenda.

Obama and the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act
President Obama entered office at the height of the Great Recession. Late during the
2008 campaign, it became clear that a stimulus bill of some sort would be required. However, the
severity of the situation grew in the period between the election and inauguration day. At a
meeting with his economic staff in December 2009, Obama was told “this is your holy shit
moment,”114 underlying the intensity of the crisis. Although his economic team requested a
stimulus of $1.3 trillion, incoming Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel immediately ruled out anything
that “started with a ‘t’”115 saying that Congress would not be willing to pass such a bill.
Emanuel, and to a lesser extent then-Vice President Biden, “was seen as something of a
political bodyguard for the relatively inexperienced Obama.”116 This mirrors Clinton’s reliance
on staff as the primary conduit for political negotiation between the White House and Congress.
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Obama’s primary focus was a Keynesian stimulus, predicated upon the idea that
“government spending could create jobs and grow the economy.”117 To Obama’s team “there
was no danger of too much stimulus” the only question was “How do you make politically
salable?”118 Therefore, it is fair to measure the political success of Obama’s stimulus package by
whether it was as large as his team believed it could be.
Obama proclaimed his interest in working alongside Republicans to craft the bill.
Debates with House Minority Whip Eric Cantor led him to include “elements he assumed
Cantor’s caucus would support.” However, Obama’s approach of assuming he knew
Republicans’ desires did not result in good feelings. Speaking to Cantor, Obama said

“‘Republicans like business expensing. They like bonus depreciation.’ Cantor resented
Obama’s presumption that he knew what Republicans wanted, and what their priorities were,
without consulting them.”119

Despite strong resistance and skepticism from Republican leadership, the White House
continued to set expectations high that ARRA would receive Republican votes. However, as the
bill was written “it turned out there was less money than expected, and support began to
evaporate.”120 Even Joseph Cao, a Republican from a deep blue district in New Orleans, changed
his vote to vote against the plan after the White House put out a list showing his district would
receive the least amount of funding of any congressional district. While the minutia of legislative
maneuvering is not left up to the president, the president is chief legislator and therefore the wins
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and losses are ultimately afforded to him. While the bill that passed Congress was the same
amount as originally announced by the White House, it was lower than desired by Obama’s
economic team and lacked the large amount of bipartisanship that Obama had aimed for.
President Obama’s bill was the only stimulus bill of the three to garner Republican votes,
although it was not nearly as bipartisan as the Obama White House had envisioned.121 While
Obama’s team sought a bipartisan bill that symbolized cooperation during a crisis, in reality they
only persuaded three moderate Republican Senators to vote for the bill – the minimum needed to
break the filibuster.
It also noteworthy that Obama and Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid chose
not to use the reconciliation process to advance the stimulus bill. Reconciliation, only requiring a
simple majority, would have enabled the Democratic Congress to bypass the desires of their
more moderate members and the Republicans and pass a larger sized stimulus. This legislative
procedure has an extensive number of steps to it, including a sustained back-and-forth between
the House and Senate. Given the immediacy of the crisis and Obama’s desire to sign the bill
before President’s Day, leadership may have decided that reconciliation was too lengthy of a
process. Indeed, Obama’s bill was signed into law the earliest out of the three by nearly a month,
marking a victory for him.
Overall, Obama managed to follow through on his announcement and pass ARRA
through a heavily Democratic Congress. However, he managed to dampen his own victory by
setting high expectations of bipartisanship and failing to meet them. Additionally, his stimulus
bill was smaller than his economic team had desired and his legislative relationship with
Congress was damaged by the way this bill became law.
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Throughout the rest of 2009, Obama’s team struggled to accomplish large swaths of his
legislative agenda. In large part, this is because of the White House’s single-minded focus on
healthcare reform. While this focus would pay off in 2010 through the passage of the Affordable
Care and Patient Protection Act, commonly known as Obamacare, it overtook the possibility of
passing any other major legislation, particularly action on Climate Change that the White House
desired. In 2010, Congress and the Obama White House would prove to be exceptionally
effective, passing the Dodd-Frank Act, the Fair Sentencing Act, another economic omnibus, and
the Repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. However, for the sake of this analysis, Obama struggled to
accomplish his agenda in 2009 following the passage of ARRA.

Biden and the American Rescue Plan Act
President Biden assumed the presidency during both a severe economic recession and the
COVID-19 Pandemic. His signature American Rescue Plan therefore sought to address both of
these difficulties, with a dual track of investments both in Keynesian stimulus and COVID-19
mitigation, vaccination, and treatment efforts.
Following the wins of Senators Jon Ossoff and Raphael Warnock in Georgia on January
5th, 2021, Democrats gained a narrow federal trifecta for the first time since 2010. This control
empowered Biden and his economic team to push for an expanded stimulus, which they
ballparked at $1.9 Trillion for everything they desired.122 Immediately, the Biden White House
and Democratic Majority Leader Chuck Schumer began to initiate the reconciliation process to
enable themselves to circumnavigate a nearly guaranteed Republican filibuster. However, as
Woodward and Costa write, the Biden team also held a meeting with ten moderate Republican
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Senators, so as to both preserve a working relationship and evaluate the potential for
collaboration. However, they did not commit to a bipartisan plan:

“One thing was certain. [The Biden White House] did not want to get ‘Charlie Browned.’
They had seen this play before with the football snatched away at the last minute by the
Senate Republicans. They could not wait indefinitely. Even if eight of the Republicans at
the meeting voted with Biden, 58 total votes would not be enough – two short of the 60
needed to support a filibuster.”123

Biden’s strategy of pursuing bipartisanship while also empowering his own party to pass a
partisan bill on their own terms was one that was shaped by his years of Senatorial politics and
political battles. While talking to moderate Democratic Senator Joe Manchin (D-WV), Biden
emphasized the time-sensitive nature of the moment:

“Joe, Biden said, I’ve lived through these situations and I’m trying to work through this. I
prefer the bipartisan path, but that takes time. Unfortunately, we don’t have time here
because of the pandemic and the economy. There was a deadline ahead, March 14, when
supplemental unemployment benefits would begin to lapse.”124

Indeed, Biden and his team chose to pursue the reconciliation path. In doing so, Biden
managed to get his plan passed with hardly any changes made in either the House or the Senate.
The only exception was a slight drawdown in unemployment benefits, with a compromise with
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Sen. Manchin resulting in the program ending one month earlier and the supplemental benefits
falling from $400 to $300.125 Manchin had initially sought further changes to the bill, but Biden
managed to corral Manchin using tactics and lessons gleaned from past experience. Woodward
and Costa note two of the pivotal strategies used to convince Manchin to vote for the bill. Early
on, Biden assessed his approach to Manchin,

“Biden knew it would be hard to persuade Manchin, even if West Virginia was slated to
receive lots of money. You had to win him, not buy him”126

Later, once the bill had stalled on the Senate Floor, Biden weighed the benefits of getting
personally involved:

“He had been through hundreds of legislative fights. The presidential call had a special
weight. It was the final twist of the arm”127

The knowledge used in both of situations, that of the idiosyncrasies of Senators and how a
president’s call can impact their voting behavior, is knowledge gained through years of
experience working in Washington, D.C. that proved beneficial to Biden in this moment.
Once signed, Biden’s bill maintained the same topline figure, $1.9 trillion, that his team
had sought and announced – the only of the three bills to be so. His bill was signed into law in
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mid-March, the second of the three examined. Biden’s bill received no Republican votes, though
he also did not expect it to, nor did he set expectations of a bipartisan bill. Finally, ARPA had the
fewest intraparty defections of any of the bills examined, with only Representative Jared Golden
(D-ME) voting against the bill. This is the most successful of the three bills by the measurements
used.
In 2021, Biden’s legislative agenda was divided into two parts: an infrastructure bill that
sought to repair America’s infrastructure and a social spending bill dubbed the “Build Back
Better Act.” Of the two, Biden was only able to pass the infrastructure piece, later titled the
Bipartisan Infrastructure Act, into law. The failure to pass Build Back Better surely counts as a
mark against his legislative agenda. Other Biden goals, including a voting rights bill, a police
reform bill, and many others, were unable to overcome Republican filibusters in the Senate. Thus
far, 2022 has seen a number of bipartisan bills signed into law, including a bill to reform the
United States Postal Service and the reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act.

Conclusion
If my hypothesis was correct, that Washington experience made the president a more
efficient legislator, then one would expect to see indications that the most efficient president was
Biden followed by Obama followed by Clinton. By many measures this is what is seen. Biden
succeeded in getting his entire desired amount of stimulus, suffered only one defection, and used
an archaic legislative process to maneuver around partisan obstruction. However, one outlier is
that under Obama, ARRA was passed a month earlier than Biden’s ARPA.
However, it is possible that confounding variables may explain the differences in case
studies. For example, it is possible that the smaller Democratic majorities in Congress under
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Biden made for more cohesive caucuses since a member might be less likely to contradict
leadership alone.
It is also possible that variables that have changed over time explain the difference. For
instance, the Democratic party has become more ideologically cohesive over time,128 perhaps
leading to a party more compliant with the requests of the president. Additionally, the filibuster
has become much more common in recent years,129 perhaps leading a normalization of
legislative steps such as reconciliation that can be used to maneuver around it. Combined, these
variables may help explain Biden and ARPA’s success in comparison to their predecessors.
Regardless, there is substantive evidence presented in this chapter that there is a difference in
effectiveness between the legislative success of these three presidents in their first stimulus bill.
Clinton was unable to achieve nearly any of his bill while Biden managed to have nearly no
change, even while his party’s majority in Congress was notably smaller. This suggests a
difference in legislative ability which contributes to the premise of this thesis.
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Chapter 5: Party Organizational Success
The third and final criterion studied in this thesis is the presidents’ ability as party leader
to lead a successful and organizationally competent Democratic party. As party leader, presidents
are responsible for the organizational health of the entire Democratic Party, including its ability
to raise money, recruit candidates, and get out the vote. Organizational strength is vital to ensure
the party’s success electorally and legislatively continues throughout the long term. Therefore,
the president’s management of the party determines its success outside of just one election. To
measure party organization, this chapter will look at both the fundraising of the national
Democratic Campaign organizations as well as media and expert analysis of the party
organization under the different presidents.
Jacobson et al. describe presidents as “their parties’ chief fund-raisers”130 and explain that
they can “use their extraordinary fund-raising ability to help their parties win congressional
contests they might otherwise lose.”131 Therefore, a president assisting his party in raising more
money is one that is investing more into supporting his party’s organizational strength. While
Jacobson et al. used an in-depth analysis of the money raised from fundraisers that Clinton
himself attended, this chapter uses wider-lens analysis in Figure 5.1 to assess the amount of
money raised by the big three Democratic campaign committees. Future analysis of this aspect of
presidential leadership may find a style similar to Jacobson et al. more advantageous, especially
when data from the entirety of the midterm cycles is available.
The campaign finance information is available on the Federal Election Commission’s
(FEC) website and compiled using receipt statements by the author. This data is also adjusted for
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inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator through
January 2022.

1993

Figure 5.1
2009

2021

Organization
DNC

$56,982,279.11

$110,832,616.36

$ 151,259,719.35

DCCC

$14,677,359.99

$73,565,779.90

$ 146,325,744.53

DSCC

$20,459,208.42

$57,622,323.26

$

91,207,169.50

The three organizations used here are the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), and the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee (DSCC). These are the three national party committees used by the
Democratic party to finance federal campaigns for Congress. Since the president must work with
Congress to pass his agenda, he has a vested interest in helping elect his fellow partisans to
Congress and fundraising is a key tool to that end.
Figure 5.1 shows that, even adjusted for inflation, the DNC, DCCC, and DSCC have
clearly raised the most money under Biden’s presidency, followed by Obama’s, followed by
Clinton. This reflects the increased amount of money raised in political campaigns in the United
States,132 but also the increased ability of presidents to raise money for their party.
Given that the quantitative evidence is not indicative of one president being more
effective organizationally than the others, other qualitative evidence will be used to clarify the
organizational capacity of the Democratic Party under each of these presidents.

William C. R. Horncastle, “The Scale of US Election Spending Explained in Five Graphs,” The Conversation,
October 15, 2020, http://theconversation.com/the-scale-of-us-election-spending-explained-in-five-graphs-130651.
132

McJessy 56

First, the president as party leader is responsible for choosing the Chairman of the
Democratic National Committee.133 The DNC Chairman functions as the formal leader of the
Democratic Party and is responsible in the long-term for building and supporting the party and in
the short-term supporting the president’s agenda.134 Therefore, each president’s choice for DNC
Chairman is revealing about their approach to the party organization.
As his first DNC Chairman, Clinton chose David Wilhelm “who had served as Clinton’s
campaign manager in 1992” and was the youngest DNC Chairman in history.135 This choice of a
close aide to head the DNC showed a clear intention on behalf of Clinton to maintain a strong
influence over the committee’s actions. The Los Angeles Times noted the difference between
Wilhelm and his predecessor Chairman Ronald H. Brown:

“Brown was a polished, prosperous, Washington operator. He stayed out of the party’s
ideological quarrels and focused on raising big money for the 1992 contest. Wilhelm, by
contrast, is a rumpled, homespun outsider who never looks quite comfortable is a suit and
tie. Their common allegiance to Bill Clinton conceals a significant shift from plutocracy
to populism at party headquarters.”136
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Given the DNC’s role, it is perhaps unexpected that Clinton would choose an outsider to run the
organization. Indeed, Wilhelm’s relationship with Congress was rocky. His leadership was
criticized by Democratic members of Congress who felt that the DNC’s messaging surrounding
President Clinton’s budget was “inept.”137 Wilhelm’s selection by Clinton is a choice that
signaled a desire to maintain the DNC as practically an arm of the White House as opposed to
the headquarters for the party at-large.
President Obama’s first choice as DNC Chairman was then-Virginia Governor Tim
Kaine. Kaine was a close friend of Obama’s and a member of his short list for vice president.138
However, unusually for the DNC Chairman, Kaine was serving as the incumbent governor of
Virginia through January 2010, meaning that he was limited in his role from the beginning. At
the announcement of his chairmanship, he “pledged to be a part-time leader for the party”
through the rest of his term as governor.139 Atlantic reporter Edward Isaac-Dovere described
Kaine’s job at the DNC as “commuting two days a week to oversee the pilfering of talent,
money, resources, and purpose for the Obama reelection effort that was already under way.”140
After leaving the Governor’s office in January 2010, Kaine was still dual-employed, teaching as
a lecturer at the University of Richmond School of Law.141 While Kaine was a close friend of
Obama, he lacked any prior Washington experience himself and maintained a second job
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throughout his time as DNC Chairman, suggesting a lack of commitment to the position and a
lack of interest in building up the organization as a its own force in the party.
President Biden’s choice to lead the DNC was former South Carolina State Party Chair,
Associate Chair of the Democratic National Committee and former U.S. Senate candidate Jaime
Harrison. Harrison is the only of the three inaugural DNC Chairmen to have prior experience
leading a state party and is described as a “institution builder.”142 In contrast to the Wilhelm and
Kaine who were intent on reelecting the president, Harrison entered the position as a “selfproclaimed ‘Howard Dean acolyte,’”143 alluding to the former Vermont Governor and DNC
Chairman who pioneered an organizational strategy of empowering all 50 state parties.
Harrison also is unique among the Chairmen for his lack of a direct tie to Biden himself.
Instead, Harrison was promoted by powerful House Majority Whip Jim Clyburn (D-SC) who
viewed him as the ideal candidate for the role due to his past experience as a state party chair,
DNC associate chair, and candidate.144 This lack of a close tie to Biden has led to a somewhat
“strained” relationship with the White House as the party navigates difficult political waters.145
The examples seen through these DNC Chairmen lead to a conclusion that perhaps the ideal
Chairman would be one who has creditability with the president, congress, and the state party
chairs, as well as someone who is invested in the role for the full term of office. Although
imperfect, Harrison seems to have fit these criteria the best out of the three inaugural chairmen.
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Finally, to completely assess the presidents’ overall caretaking of the party, one must
look at the actions of the DNC and party apparatus itself under each president. Under President
Clinton, he treated the DNC as primarily a messaging apparatus and a base of operations to
prepare for Clinton’s future re-election. Presidential Scholar Daniel Galvin described the DNC’s
operations as it worked alongside the White House’s push for its economic bill and health care
reform:

“Clinton foisted upon the DNC responsibility for running a large portion of his public
relations campaign. But rather than pour resources into his party and turn the experience
into a party-building affair, the health care campaign swamped normal operations at the
DNC and supplanted electoral operations in many state and local party organizations.
Rather than prepare for the 1994 midterm elections by developing programs to register
voters, enlist volunteers, recruit candidates, raise money, and draw up campaign plans,
Democratic Party organizations were told to focus their efforts on selling the president’s
agenda.”146

Instead of utilizing the DNC to build up the party’s reputation, the party’s organizing
capacity, or the party’s fundraising, the DNC was channeled into a singular purpose of selling
Clinton’s legislative efforts to the public. While communications and messaging can build
popular support for legislation, it does not have the same legislative negotiating ability as the
White House. The primary talent of the DNC is to build up capacity to win elections. By shifting
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the DNC into an arm of the White House, Clinton harmed his party’s ability to compete
competitively in future elections.
In contrast to the messaging operation that Clinton demanded from the DNC, Obama’s
treatment of the organization amounted to cannibalizing it for the purposes of his future reelection with Isaac-Dovere writing that “Obama used the party structure as a host for his
campaign.”147 Indeed, Obama seemed uncomfortable with the role of party infrastructure even
after he became president and party leader. Therefore, he moved most of the party resources,
including money, personnel, and data from his campaign to Organizing for America (OFA),
which

“was the product of Obama’s deciding to keep his reelection campaign structure active
but pulling all its top talent, support, and donors…Instead of spending his second term
rebuilding the DNC, Obama created another group to do what the DNC already did, but
even less effectively, and only for his own promotion.”148

As opposed to transferring his political might entirely to the DNC or fulling integrating
OFA within the DNC, OFA “enjoyed ‘departmental’ status, retained control of its own email list,
and was managed by Obama campaign staffers, rather than DNC personnel.”149 This shows
Obama’s mistrust of the official Democratic Party apparatus, reflective of his brief experience in
Washington and his role as an “outsider” during the 2008 Campaign. Both the DNC and OFA
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were responsible for policy advocacy during 2009 and 2010, particularly for the Affordable Care
Act. However, those familiar with Obama’s approach to the party infrastructure categorize him
as exceptionally skeptical of the DNC and the necessity of building a wider Democratic Party,
with some categorizing his treatment of the party as “benign neglect”150 Even supporters of
Obama admit that

“Obama never built a Democratic bench and never cared to, aside from a few scattered
candidates who interested him”151

Obama’s leadership of the Democratic Party was one of a utilitarian purpose and one that had
little purpose outside of his own re-election.
Biden, like Obama,152 entered the White House with scholars believing that he could turn
around the organizational strength of the Democratic Party and become “modern history’s first
Democratic presidential party-builder – that is, the first modern president who prioritizes
building up his party as well as enacting policy.”153 At first glance, it appears that Biden took
steps to empower the DNC and through the DNC, state parties. A fundraising agreement was
brokered to provide $23 million to state parties, as well as extra money to states where
Republicans are in power.154 This is the type of party investment that Galvin and others argued
would bolster the party infrastructure.
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However, there have been fissures in the relationship between the Biden White House and the
DNC as well. Recent reporting suggests that Harrison and the DNC have been limited in their
independence and that there has been friction as to the role of each.155 However, there has been
consistent reporting that Biden and top Democratic campaign officials have begun to meet more
frequently as the 2022 midterm elections approach.156 Biden’s long history in Washington
indicates that he is familiar with the necessity of building a strong party infrastructure, not just
winning the White House in one election.

Conclusion
A famous op-ed by former Senator Bill Bradley argued that the Democratic Party was
“still hypnotized by Jack Kennedy, and the promise of a charismatic leader who can change
America by the strength and style of his personality.”157 In many ways, both Presidents Clinton
and Obama were presidents in the mold of Jack Kennedy. Both held impressive oratorical skills,
were classically good-looking, and gained attention by force of their individual story. In doing
so, they found a way of getting elected without navigating or relying upon the traditional
Democratic Party structure, and so when they assumed the role of party leader, they neglected
those tools that they had found unnecessary. In Senator Bradley’s words, “Charisma didn’t
translate into structure.”158 This is seen through their choices of DNC Chairs, personal allies with

Mike Memoli, “Biden Greenlights $15 Million Infusion to Democratic Campaign Committees,” NBC News,
2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/biden-greenlights-15-million-infusion-democratic-campaigncommittees-n1288562.
156
Memoli.
157
Bill Bradley, “A Party Inverted,” The New York Times, March 30, 2005, sec. Opinion,
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/30/opinion/a-party-inverted.html.
158
Bradley.
155

McJessy 63
little history of institution or party-building, as well as their approach to the DNC, which they
viewed as a tool to promote their administrations first and foremost.
In contrast, Biden has taken a party-conscious approach to party leadership. In his choice
of Jamie Harrison as DNC Chairman, he empowered someone who had lengthy experience in
leading Democratic institutions as well as strengthening ties with a key political ally in Rep. Jim
Clyburn. His commitment of national funds to state parties indicates an interest in building up a
political bench to be active after his time in office.
One potential reason for this is the uncertainty about whether Biden will seek a second
term in office. Preoccupations with reelection drove many of Clinton and Obama’s choices to
reallocate resources from the party to the president, and given Biden’s age, there is bountiful
speculation that he will not seek a second term. However, I would argue that the defining
variable in Biden’s decision-making is not age, but experience in Washington. His half-century
in Washington showed him the longevity of politics and the necessity of a continued Democratic
party independent of any one president. Having lived through election cycles that were unkind to
Democrats, Biden is familiar with the chutes-and-ladders nature of politics and has a vested
interest in the long-term success of the Democratic Party as seen through his active choices to
empower the party organization.

McJessy 64
Chapter 6: Conclusion
During the first presidential debate of the 2020 presidential election, then-President
Donald Trump alleged that then-former Vice President Joe Biden and the Democratic Party as a
whole was in thrall to the progressive wing of the party, and that if he were to be elected, they
would “dominate” him. In response, Biden said

“Right now, I am the Democratic Party…The platform of the Democratic Party is what I,
in fact, approved of, what I approved of.”159

This moment was remarkable. Biden’s unconditional support for and pride in the
Democratic Party is unique among the prior two Democratic Presidents. In a world where the
past four presidents had challenged their own party infrastructure, whether through Clinton’s
work with the DLC, Bush’s “compassionate conservatism,” Obama’s willingness to fault both
parties for gridlock, or Trump’s assault on the Republican establishment, it stands out that Biden
so strongly affiliates himself with the label “Democrat.” The reason for this is the longevity of
Biden’s career. Throughout decades in the Senate and as Vice-President, Biden’s successes were
not personal, he lost two prior runs for the presidency, but as a part of the Democratic Party as a
whole.
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However, as president, Biden would be empowered as never before to lead the
Democratic Party to success. Therefore, this thesis sought to answer whether Biden’s experience
in Washington and his accompanying affinity for the Democratic Party positively impacted his
stewardship of the party over his first year in office as compared to the first years of Presidents
Clinton and Obama. To do so, this thesis examined three aspects that define presidential success
as party leader: electoral success, legislative success, and party organizational success.
In examining electoral success, this thesis uses the results from the off-year elections of
the Virginia and New Jersey Gubernatorial elections, the Virginia House of Delegates election,
the New Jersey State Senate elections, and assorted congressional special elections. In order to
compare the results to each other, the raw percentage was subtracted from the corresponding
percentage of the Democratic candidates four years prior. Analysis of the results found that there
was a slight increase in the performance of Democratic candidates under Biden as compared to
Obama or Clinton. The most substantial change occurred in the gubernatorial elections, where
the Democratic candidates went from losing roughly ten percent to only roughly four percent.
However, it was not clear that increase was clearly independent from the general shift towards
Democratic candidates seen in New Jersey and Virginia. Therefore, it is unclear that Washington
experience in a president makes him a more effective electoral party leader.
To examine legislative success, this thesis used the first stimulus bill of each
administration as a case study to compare the presidents’ abilities to accomplish his legislative
agenda. In order to assess the level of success, this thesis compared the number of votes obtained
for the bill, the amount of money in the bill as a percentage of the amount of requested, and the
date on which the bill was signed into law. The evidence from this section heavily supports the
hypothesis that Washington experience causes presidents to be more successful in legislating.
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Clinton, with zero prior years of experience in Washington, was the least successful in all three
categories, with the least percentage of money won, the least members voting for the bill, and the
latest signing date. Obama was more successful than Clinton, with the earliest singing date, most
of the money desired won, and most of each caucus voting for the bill. However, Biden was the
unequivocal success story in this chapter, with all of his money desired being included in the bill,
only one member of his own party voting against the bill, and a bill signing in between the other
two presidents. If Edwards160 was correct in his argument that the size of majorities determines
success, not presidential skill, the results would be the opposite. Therefore, this evidence
suggests that Washington experience in a president is beneficial to legislative success.
The third criterion, party organizational success, this thesis used the proxies of
fundraising, DNC leadership, and DNC behavior. The fundraising numbers from the national
committees, the DCCC, DSCC, and DNC, showed that the amount of money raised has
increased dramatically over the years. However, this correlates with the increasing amount of
money spent on campaigning in general, so no conclusion can be drawn from the data. Instead, a
qualitative analysis of the DNC Chairmen and the behavior of the DNC is more revealing about
the success of the party organization under each president.
Clinton and Obama both chose DNC Chairmen who were close personal allies as well as
had little prior experience organizing party infrastructure. In contrast, Biden chose a former state
party chair and a former DNC associate chair with close ties to Congress to lead the DNC.
Clinton and Obama both turned the DNC into an organization dedicated partly to selling their
agenda and partly on their own reelection. In contrast, under Biden the DNC has donated more
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money towards state parties than ever before and has begun once again investing in long term
party organizing capabilities. Although difficult to measure in the short-term, it appears that
Washington experience is beneficial to a president’s ability or willingness to successfully build
up the Democratic Party infrastructure.

Potential Future Areas of Study
The inherent constraint of this thesis is its timing only one year into Biden’s presidency.
The first two years through a midterm election of a presidency would be a much more natural
period of time for a study such as this because it encompasses the entirety of a Congress,
includes midterm results, and has the full election cycle of fundraising information. Future
studies will have access to the full two years of information and will better be able to compare
each of these presidencies.
Additionally, an academic or journalist with more resources may be able to find a method
of counting the number of fundraisers attended and the amount raised by a president. This
information, which was recorded for the 1999-2000 election cycle with President Clinton,161
would provide another window into the presidents’ dedication to building up the party structure
and organization.
This research could also be performed with the Republican Party, using reverse
chronology and measuring the success of President Bush Sr. against that of his son and President
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Trump. However, the parallel federal trifecta does not exist for the Republican Party, potentially
complicating the comparison.
Finally, future research on this topic could expand the presidents studied in order to draw
a more wide-ranging conclusion. In particular, President Carter stands as someone with very
little Washington experience in contrast to President Johnson. Given the difficulty of comparing
political success over such large shifts in the political climate, it would be more appropriate for a
researcher with more resources to include more presidents.

Conclusion
The Democratic Party has declined severely from its prime during the mid-20th Century.
At its peak, the party held the House of Representatives for nearly 40 years while also holding
nearly 80% of Governorships.162 Now, even after two unnaturally successful elections for the
party, Democrats have a tenuous grip on Congress, hold barely 40% of Governorships, and are
facing years in the political wilderness due to a political structure that systemically works against
them.163 In order to navigate these difficult waters and succeed against the odds, the Democratic
Party will need to have exceptionally adroit leadership. The foremost choice that most
Democratic voters have over their party is choosing who leads it. Therefore, it is crucial that
those voters know what criteria they should be assessing when choosing a presidential nominee
and party leader.
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Bill Clinton once said, “Democrats want to fall in love; Republicans just fall in line.”
This approach, of the Democratic electorate searching for someone who has charisma, intellect,
eloquence, political savvy, and is also not part of “Washington” has gotten two recent
Democratic presidents elected. It has also led many other candidates to have breakout
presidential campaigns, most recently those of Senator Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and nowTransportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg. However, has that approach lead to the most effective
party leadership possible? This thesis suggests that it has not.
Despite President Biden’s years of Washington experience and lack of Kennedy-esque
charisma, the evidence so far suggests that Biden is just as successful, if not more so, than his
two Democratic predecessors. He has done so with markedly smaller margins in Congress and a
significantly more polarized electorate. It has yet to be seen how Biden’s presidency will play
out and how it will compare to entireties of his predecessors’ presidencies, but at this moment,
Biden’s unique amount of Washington experience has proven a boon to his time in office.
Although voters seem to prefer and reward candidates who run against government and
“Washington experience,” Biden provides a compelling argument in favor of those with
experience. Voters, especially Democratic voters, will have to decide in the coming years if they
wish to keep looking for the next Kennedy, the next unicorn candidate who has it all, or if they
will instead put the federal government in the hands of someone who is well-tested and true. Will
they choose style or substance? This thesis argues for substance and experience in our party
leadership above all else.
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